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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 was designed to curtail class action law-
suits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-
technology industry, accountants, and invest-
ment bankers thought that they had been
unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based
on little more than declines in a company’s stock
price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free
rein to use the discovery process to troll for evi-
dence to support its claims. Moreover, the high
costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with
which to coerce companies to settle claims. 
The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have
called for a repeal or modification of the PSLRA.
This paper evaluates the operation of class action
lawsuits before and after the act. The hard evidence
does not support repealing the PSLRA. In fact,
securities class actions are being filed at a record
pace. And although a higher percentage of these
lawsuits is being dismissed now than before the act,
the ones that survive lead to larger settlements.
The PSLRA raised the standard required before
plaintiffs’ attorneys could drag a defendant compa-
ny through the expense of discovery. The lawsuits
that meet this higher standard are likely to be less
frivolous and are consequently worth more in set-
tlement negotiations. The combination of higher
settlements and a smaller percentage of such cases
getting to trial suggests that the class action law-
suits under the PSLRA are doing a more cost-effec-
tive job of deterring corporate fraud. This conclu-
sion is bolstered by the fact that post-PSLRA com-
plaints have more particularized allegations that
are more highly correlated with factors related to
fraud. In short, the PSLRA is working well,
although not as well as intended, and there do not
appear to be grounds to either repeal or significant-
ly amend it. A better course for reform would be to
change the damages remedy in securities fraud
class actions to focus on deterrence.
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Introduction
The enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was a victory
for accountants, securities firms, and the
high-technology industry, all of which
sought to curtail what they perceived as a tor-
rent of securities fraud class actions. Those
groups believed that they had been unjustly
victimized by lawsuits alleging “fraud by
hindsight,” based on little more than a sud-
den drop in a company’s stock price. Despite
the vigorous resistance put up by the plain-
tiffs’ class action bar, which saw the law as a
threat to their very lucrative livelihoods, pro-
ponents succeeded in persuading Congress
to override President Bill Clinton’s veto of
the bill and enact the PSLRA.
Subsequent events have substantially
diminished the lobbying clout of the indus-
tries that promoted the PSLRA. Arthur
Andersen’s involvement in the accounting
legerdemain at Enron and subsequent crimi-
nal convictions have brought disrepute on
the accounting industry as a whole.
Incriminating e-mails from Merrill Lynch,
Credit Suisse First Boston, and Salomon
Smith Barney suggest that the stock picks
that brokers offer their clients may be little
more credible than the pitch of the average
used-car salesman. The collapse of the high-
tech bubble erased $4.3 trillion in market cap-
italization from the National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System. Each of those developments has left
multitudes of angry investors in its wake. As
a result, Congress—always attuned to the
anguish of angry investors—is a much less
hospitable place for accountants, investment
bankers, and high-tech entrepreneurs than it
was a few years ago.
Not surprisingly, opponents of securities
fraud class action reform see an opportunity
to roll back the PSLRA. The recent spate of
corporate scandals has brought the class
action bar to the surface, lured by the
prospect of tens of millions of dollars in
attorneys’ fees. Andersen’s criminal convic-
tion drove it into bankruptcy, but the
remaining Big Four accounting firms, the big
investment banks, and numerous high-tech
companies face a raft of lawsuits seeking bil-
lions of dollars in damages and healthy con-
tingent fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. That
class action windfall is not enough for the
class action bar. They see Enron, Worldcom,
and the host of lesser scandals that have fol-
lowed as their great chance to undo the secu-
rities litigation reforms that Congress adopt-
ed in 1995. 
The Enron fiasco, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
say, shows that the curbs on abusive lawsuits
created by the PSLRA give corporations carte
blanche to engage in fraud. Plaintiffs’ lawyer
William Lerach, dean of the class action bar,
labels the PSLRA the “Corporate License to
Lie Act.” He says that there is “no question
that the [PSLRA] emboldened executives to
think they could do whatever they wanted.”1
The class action bar’s friends in the media
have joined the call for a rollback of securities
litigation reform. The New York Times frets
that the PSLRA “may prove to be an obstacle
to investors as they try to recover tens of bil-
lions of dollars from Enron, which has filed
for bankruptcy protection, as well as its audi-
tors, lawyers, bankers, partners and others
who may have been involved.”
2
That chorus is being heard in the halls of
Congress. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) held
hearings last year on the implications of
Enron for securities class action reforms.
Leahy voted against the PSLRA, he says,
because “its special legal protections might
lead to future financial scandals. Beginning
with Enron, the chickens have come home to
roost.”3 Bills have been introduced in the
House and Senate that would repeal critical
provisions of securities class action reform.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did not
incorporate those provisions, although it did
extend the time period for filing fraud
claims. But the drumbeat for further corpo-
rate governance reform is certain to include a
call for loosening restrictions on securities
class actions.











repealing the PSLRA. First, it briefly
describes how securities fraud class actions
operate. Then it discusses the impetus
behind the PSLRA and provides an outline of
its principal provisions. The study then sur-
veys the impact of the PSLRA on securities
fraud class actions. It also evaluates the pro-
posals to roll back certain provisions of the
PSLRA and offers an alternative reform for
securities class actions to enhance their deter-




To understand securities fraud class actions,
we first need to understand the market abuse
that they are intended to remedy. Securities
fraud class actions target misrepresentations
that are very different from what we customar-
ily think of as fraud; the corporations that are
held responsible for the damages generally do
not benefit from the misrepresentations. As a
result, the law of fraud does not quite fit those
misrepresentations, thereby creating policy
dilemmas with no easy solution.
Some Economics of Fraud
Why do we worry about corporate fraud?
In addition to the obvious moral objection to
lying, economic analysis supports strong
sanctions for fraud. Most conspicuously,
fraud may influence how investors direct
their capital. Firms that issue securities tend
to disclose more information about them-
selves in an effort to attract investors. If those
disclosures are fraudulent, investors will pay
an inflated price for those securities and
companies will invest in projects that are not
cost justified. Fraud may also allow compa-
nies to retain money or other resources that
would be better deployed elsewhere.
Managers who fraudulently inflate their
company’s stock price may be able to invest
in ill-advised empire building instead of pay-
ing cash flows as dividends to shareholders.
Alternatively, managers may use fraud to
keep the firm in business when its assets
should be redirected through bankruptcy.
The bottom line: if capital markets are infect-
ed by fraud, publicly traded firms will face a
higher cost of capital because investors will
discount the amount that they are willing to
pay for securities to reflect the risk of fraud. 
Misrepresentations by corporate man-
agers also hurt the shareholders’ ability to
monitor the firm’s performance and, more
specifically, to evaluate the job the firm’s
managers are doing. Insofar as fraud insu-
lates managers from scrutiny, it also may dis-
tort the market for corporate control. Poor
managers may be able to discourage hostile
acquirers by creating the illusion of strong
performance. Deterring corporate misrepre-
sentations therefore can help make managers
more accountable to shareholders. 
The U.S. scheme of securities regulation
deploys a variety of countermeasures to discour-
age fraud. Financial statements are audited by
reputable accounting firms. Audit committees of
outside directors provide independent oversight
of company disclosures. Rating agencies provide
assessments of companies’ creditworthiness.
Analysts rate the credibility and completeness of
company disclosures. In addition to those market
mechanisms, fraud is further deterred by
Securities and Exchange Commission enforce-
ment and criminal prosecution of defrauders by
the Justice Department and state prosecutors.
Class actions promise additional deter-
rence. In fact, the SEC considers private class
actions a “necessary supplement” to its own
efforts to police fraud. Class actions, howev-
er, promise more than added deterrence; they
also promise compensation to the victims of
fraud. That promise of compensation—and
the enormous damages that might be neces-
sary to fulfill that promise—strikes genuine
fear into the hearts of corporate executives.
Surprisingly, the potential for large damages
may undermine the deterrent value of securi-
ties fraud class actions, as discussed below.
Securities Fraud Class Actions
The reason that securities class actions
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the supposed need for compensation, but
class actions promise compensation in cases
in which it is not justified. Compensation is
important in cases in which the corporation
has been selling securities through fraud.
Compensation corrects the distortion caused
by fraud in two ways. First, requiring com-
pensation to the victim discourages the cor-
poration from committing the fraud.
Second, compensation discourages investors
from expending resources trying to avoid
fraud. Expenditures by both the perpetrator
and the victim of fraud are a social waste, so
compensation makes sense in that context.4
The federal securities laws encourage such
fraud suits by providing a very generous stan-
dard for recovery, but despite that encour-
agement, claims asserting a misrepresenta-
tion made by a company in connection with
an offering of securities make up only a small
percentage of securities class actions.5
The overwhelming majority of securities
fraud class actions have little effect on capital
allocation because the corporations sued are
not selling securities. In the typical securities
fraud class action, plaintiffs’ attorneys sue
the corporation and its officers under Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act6 for
alleged misrepresentations regarding the
company’s operations, financial perfor-
mance, or future prospects that inflate the
price of the company’s stock in secondary
trading markets such as the New York Stock
Exchange or Nasdaq. Because the corpora-
tion has not sold securities (and thereby
transferred wealth to itself), it has no institu-
tional incentive to spend real resources in
executing the fraud.
That type of fraud, commonly referred to
as fraud on the market, also differs from
what we typically consider fraud in that there
is no net wealth transfer away from investors,
at least in the aggregate. Instead, the wealth
transfers caused by fraud on the market over-
whelmingly occur between equally innocent
investors. For every shareholder who bought
at a fraudulently inflated price, another
shareholder sold: The buyer’s individual loss
is offset by the seller’s gain. Assuming all
traders are ignorant of the fraud, over time
they will come out winners as often as losers
from fraudulently distorted prices.
Therefore, shareholders should have no
expected loss from fraud on the market, so
they would have no incentive to take precau-
tions against fraud.7 They simply need to
diversify to protect themselves against the
risk of fraud.
Despite the fact that the corporation being
sued has not gained from fraud on the market,
class action lawsuits allow a full measure of
compensation to investors who come out on
the losing end of a trade at a price distorted by
misrepresentation. Those investors are entitled
to recover from the corporation their losses due
to the corporation managers’ misstatements.
Given the trading volume in secondary mar-
kets, the potential recoverable damages in such
suits can be a substantial percentage of the cor-
poration’s total capitalization, easily reaching
hundreds of millions of dollars. Occasionally
the damages measure goes much higher.
Cendant Corporation recently set records by
settling a securities fraud class action for close
to $3 billion.8 With potential damages in this
range, class actions are a big stick to wield
against fraud.
Punitive sanctions of that sort are only
appropriate, however, when they closely cor-
respond to the actual incidence of fraud.
Securities fraud class actions fall far short of
that ideal. Distinguishing fraud from mere
business reversals is difficult. The external
observer may not know whether a drop in a
company’s stock price is due to a prior inten-
tional misstatement about its prospects—
that is, fraud—or a result of risky business
decisions that did not pan out—that is, mis-
judgment or bad luck. Unable to distinguish
the two, plaintiffs’ lawyers must rely on lim-
ited publicly available indicia (e.g., SEC fil-
ings and press releases from the company,
evidence of insider trading by the managers
alleged to be responsible for the fraud) when
deciding whom to sue. Thus, a substantial
drop in stock price following news that con-
tradicts a previous optimistic statement may










That leaves courts with the difficult task
of sorting out the cases with potential merit
from the strike suits. The principal tool that
courts use in that task is the scienter stan-
dard required to establish fraud. The scienter
standard—the defendants’ knowledge that
their statements were false when made, or the
defendants’ reckless disregard for the truth—
is notoriously amorphous. It is somewhat
more stringent than negligence (would a rea-
sonable person have made the statement?),
but even in theory it is difficult to say how
much more stringent, and it is nearly impos-
sible to specify in practice. Courts and jurors,
with hindsight, may have difficulty distin-
guishing knowingly false statements from
unfortunate business decisions. Both create a
risk of liability and, thus, provide a basis for
filing suit. An uncertain standard for liability
makes filing a diverse portfolio of cases a rea-
sonable strategy for plaintiffs’ lawyers. Sue all
of the plausible candidates and let the courts
sort them out.
Filing numerous cases is not only reason-
able but also profitable for plaintiffs’ attor-
neys because of the incentives that defen-
dants face. If plaintiffs can withstand a
motion to dismiss, defendants generally will
find settlement cheaper than litigating to a
jury verdict, even if the defendants believe
that a jury would share their view of the facts.
Any case plausible enough to get past a judge
may be worth settling if only to avoid the
costs of discovery and attorneys’ fees, which
can be enormous in these cases. Securities
fraud class actions are expensive to defend
because the focus of litigation will often be
scienter, that is the extent and timing of the
defendants’ knowledge. The most helpful
source for uncovering that information will
be the documents in the company’s posses-
sion. Producing all documents relevant to
the knowledge of senior executives over many
months or even years can be a massive under-
taking for a corporate defendant. Having
produced the documents, the company can
then anticipate a seemingly endless series of
depositions, as plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to
determine whether the executives’ recollec-
tions square with the documents. The cost in
lost productivity may dwarf the expense of
attorneys’ fees and other direct litigation
costs. Beyond the cost in executives’ time, the
mere existence of the class action may dis-
rupt relationships with suppliers and cus-
tomers, who will be understandably leery of
dealing with a business accused of fraud. For
those reasons, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that securities fraud suits pose “the
threat of extensive discovery and disruption
of normal business activities.”9
Putting to one side the costs of litigation,
the enormous potential damages also make
settlement an attractive option for the compa-
ny, even when it thinks it has a good prospect
of prevailing at trial. The math is straightfor-
ward: A 10 percent chance of a $250 million
judgment means that a settlement for $24.9
million makes sense. The combination of the
cost of litigating securities class actions and
the potential for enormous judgments means
that even weak cases may produce a settle-
ment if they are not dismissed before trial. If
both weak and strong cases lead to settle-
ments, the deterrent effect of class actions is
diluted because innocent and wrongful con-
duct both lead to sanctions. 
Deterrence is further diluted by the settle-
ment dynamic in securities fraud class
actions.10 As discussed above, corporations
typically do not benefit from fraud on the
market because they are not selling securities
at the time of the fraud. Who, then, benefits?
The answer is the corporate managers who
disguised poor corporate performance in an
attempt to keep their jobs, or who inflated
profits so that they could reach targets for
incentive compensation or bring their stock
options into the money.11 Of course those
objectives benefit the managers rather than
the shareholders of the corporation. They are
examples of managers’ taking advantage of
their positions. 
Notwithstanding the self-dealing implicit
in such fraud, the corporate officers who
actually make the misrepresentations almost
never contribute to the settlement of class
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class actions is that the company and its
insurers pay to settle the claims even though
the officers are the ones responsible for the
fraud. As a result, shareholders who have
already been harmed by the loss of the cor-
poration’s credibility due to the managers’
malfeasance also get stuck with the bill for
the class action in the form of the cost of set-
tlement, payment of attorneys’ fees, and
higher directors’ and officers’ insurance pre-
miums. Securities fraud class actions are
largely a device for shifting money between
groups of shareholders, with the lawyers tak-




The legislative history of the PSLRA
reflects the legislation’s two central goals.
The first is to rein in the class action bar so
that defrauded investors receive more com-
pensation. Given the relative unimportance
of compensation, that goal might be seen as
largely a pretext for Congress to launch a par-
tisan attack on the plaintiffs’ bar. The sec-
ond, more important goal is to discourage
frivolous litigation. That promises to
enhance deterrence by more precisely target-
ing the sanctions imposed by securities class
actions. The PSLRA includes numerous pro-
visions intended to achieve those goals.
Reining in the Plaintiffs’ Bar
Congress concluded after extensive hear-
ings that plaintiffs’ lawyers were acting for
their own benefit instead of faithfully repre-
senting investors. Plaintiffs’ lawyers were tak-
ing an exorbitant share of settlements for
themselves, leaving defrauded investors with
only a fraction of the damages that they had
suffered. Plaintiffs’ lawyers could charge
handsome fees because the nominal plain-
tiffs in securities fraud class actions were typ-
ically “100-share plaintiffs.” According to the
Report on PSLRA of the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the
U.S. Senate:
Under the current system, the initia-
tive for filing 10b-5 suits comes
almost entirely from the lawyers, not
from genuine investors. Lawyers typ-
ically rely on repeat, or “profession-
al,” plaintiffs who, because they own
a token number of shares in many
companies, regularly lend their
names to lawsuits. Even worse,
investors in the class usually have
great difficulty exercising any mean-
ingful direction over the case
brought on their behalf. The lawyers
can decide when to sue and when to
settle, based largely on their own
financial interests, not the interests
of their purported clients.12
The Senate report further charged that plain-
tiffs’ lawyers recruited malleable “profession-
al plaintiffs” through “the payment of a
‘bonus’ far in excess of their share of any
recovery.”
Congress also found abuses in the settle-
ment process. Plaintiffs’ lawyers typically
received a third of the settlement, with the
plaintiffs often receiving pennies on the dol-
lar for their claims. Members of the plaintiff
class often received inadequate notice of the
terms of the settlement. Congress also criti-
cized the courts, charging that judges rubber-
stamped abusive settlements on “the premise
that a bad settlement is almost always better
than a good trial.”13
To correct those abuses, Congress enacted
a series of provisions intended to “empower
investors so that they—not their lawyers—
exercise primary control over private securi-
ties litigation.”14 The PSLRA places substan-
tial restrictions on plaintiffs’ attorneys in
connection with settlements of securities
class actions. Most notably, the law limits
attorneys’ fees to a reasonable percentage of
the class recovery. One of the more novel
reforms is the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provi-
sion. The law requires national publication
of a notice advising class members that the
6










action has been filed.15 The PSLRA then
directs the court to appoint a “lead plaintiff”
from among class members who seek to act
in that capacity. There is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the most suitable plaintiff is
the class member or group of members that
has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought. That presumption is intended to
“encourage institutional investors to take a
more active role in securities class action law-
suits.”16 The act further discourages reliance
on the “100-share plaintiff” by prohibiting
bonus payments to class representatives and
limiting plaintiffs to serving as a class repre-
sentative no more than five times during any
three-year period. Notably, the lead plaintiff
selects counsel for the class, subject to court
approval. The lawyer who initially filed the
action hopes to fill that role, but need not.
Discouraging Frivolous Suits
Congress’s second motivation in passing
the PSLRA was that class actions were being
filed in a shotgun fashion. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
were filing suits with “a laundry list of cook-
ie-cutter complaints” against companies
“within hours or days” of a substantial drop
in the company’s stock price, according to
the Report of the Committee on Commerce
of the House of Representatives on the
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995.17
Moreover, the Senate report indicated that
plaintiffs’ lawyers had incentives to “file friv-
olous lawsuits in order to conduct discovery
in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim
not alleged in the complaint.”18
Congress believed that, in the pre-PSLRA
environment, a substantial number of weak
cases settled because the underlying legal merits
could not be determined from the complaint
alone. Faced with the cost of discovery, defen-
dants found that “the pressure to settle became
enormous.”19 Even if a company were willing to
bear the expense of litigation, Congress con-
cluded that the company would inevitably set-
tle rather than face a potentially ruinous jury
verdict. The overall effect was that liability expo-
sure was chilling issuers from making state-
ments about their businesses: 
Private securities class actions under
10b-5 inhibit free and open communi-
cation among management, analysts,
and investors. This has caused corpo-
rate management to refrain from pro-
viding shareholders forward-looking
information about companies. . . . As a
result, investors often receive less, not
more, information, which makes
investing more risky and increases the
cost of raising capital.20
Congress also worried that innocent
bystanders were being caught in the securi-
ties fraud class action crossfire. According to
the Senate report, “underwriters, lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals are
prime targets of abusive securities lawsuits.
The deeper the pocket, the greater the likeli-
hood that a marginal party will be named as
a defendant in a securities class action.”21
Congress found in its conference report that
the “system of joint and several liability cre-
ates coercive pressure for entirely innocent
parties to settle meritless claims rather than
risk exposing themselves to liability for a
grossly disproportionate share of the dam-
ages in the case.”22 Joint and several liability
means that a secondary defendant could be
left holding the bag if the defendant that
engaged in the fraud later became insolvent,
a not infrequent occurrence.
Congress attempted to make securities
class actions a more precise deterrent for
fraud through a series of procedural obsta-
cles. The first barrier to frivolous class
actions is a “safe harbor” provision for pro-
jections that are not knowingly false, or that
have been qualified by “meaningful caution-
ary language.”23 That makes it very difficult
for plaintiffs to bring lawsuits based on pre-
dictions about the company’s future that
have not come true, the archetypal “fraud by
hindsight” claim.
The second barrier has a broader scope. The
PSLRA imposes a rigorous pleading standard,
which requires plaintiffs to specify in their com-
plaint each statement alleged to have been mis-
















misleading. The pleading standard also
requires plaintiffs to state with particularity
facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the
defendant acted with “the required state of
mind.”24 Those rules are applied by the judge
reviewing the complaint before any discovery
has been conducted. Thus, the pleading stan-
dard established by the PSLRA makes the com-
plaint the critical document in the case—if the
plaintiff cannot make out a credible case of
fraud when he files his suit, he cannot proceed
with his claims. Consequently, judges must
play a much more significant role in deciding
the merits of the lawsuit than they typically do. 
Plaintiffs are left without the usual access to
discovery to bolster their complaint. All discovery
is stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds that discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or prevent undue
prejudice.25 That combination of the pleading
standard and the discovery stay is designed to
weed out nonmeritorious actions at an early stage
and low cost. Early dismissal with no discovery
greatly reduces the expense to corporations
forced to defend such suits, thereby limiting the
settlement value of weak cases.
The PSLRA further reduces the coercive
threat of securities suits by eliminating securi-
ties fraud as the basis for a civil racketeering
claim under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act of 1970, with its
potential for treble damages. The PSLRA also
limits the liability of certain “peripheral” defen-
dants. The act adopts proportionate, rather
than joint and several, liability for defendants
who are not found to have knowingly violated
the securities laws.26 That protection is most
important for secondary defendants, such as
accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers,
who may be implicated in fraud by corporate
defendants. If those secondary defendants can
show that they did not know of the fraud, their
liability exposure will be limited substantially.
Effect of the PSLRA
The PSLRA has been on the books for six
years now, enough time to shed some light
on how it has changed corporate disclosure.
There is some evidence that the safe harbor
for forward-looking statements has encour-
aged issuers to be more forthcoming.27 That
begins to correct one of the more perverse
results of securities fraud class actions, the
chilling of corporate speech caused by fear of
lawsuits.
The central goal of the PSLRA, however,
was to alter practice in securities fraud class
actions, and in that regard the law clearly has
had a substantial impact. The process by
which lead plaintiffs are selected has become
reasonably settled, and after a slow start,
institutional investors are now starting to
step forward in greater numbers to take
charge of securities fraud class actions.
Although the lead plaintiff provision still
awaits systematic study, there is anecdotal
evidence that it is now beginning to have an
effect on attorneys’ fees.28 If that trend con-
tinues, the introduction of a vigorous repre-
sentative for plaintiffs–shareholders promis-
es to benefit investors by reducing the cost of
class actions.
The more fundamental question, howev-
er, is whether the PSLRA has discouraged
frivolous suits. In that regard, the news is
somewhat mixed. Courts have been vigilant
in enforcing the PSLRA’s discovery stay. On
the other hand, courts appear to be ignoring
the provision of the PSLRA targeted most
directly at frivolous actions, the mandatory
sanctions inquiry for complaints that have
been dismissed. As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers
continue to face no real sanction for sloppy
investigation before filing suit or fabricating
“facts” to allege in their complaint.
Fortunately, the PSLRA’s sanctions
inquiry requirement is not the law’s only con-
straint on frivolous actions. The PSRLA’s
most important screen for meritless suits is
the strong inference pleading standard that
requires particularized allegations of fraud in
the complaint. There are now hundreds of
judicial opinions interpreting the pleading
standard, so there is reason to think that pro-
vision is influencing the filing decisions of











they are able to obtain. Here are summaries
of the few empirical studies to date focusing
on the impact of the PSLRA on filing and set-
tlement, as well as the stock market’s reac-
tion to the law.
Filings and Settlements
The PSLRA has not reduced the number
of securities class actions being filed. In fact,
the average number of suits is up nearly 25
percent from pre-PSLRA levels,29 so it does
not appear that the PSLRA has discouraged
plaintiffs’ lawyers from filing suit. That
increase in filings does not necessarily trans-
late to greater liability exposure for corpora-
tions. There is also evidence that the PSLRA
has resulted in a higher percentage of cases
being dismissed. A study by the National
Economics Research Associates reports that
the dismissal rate for securities fraud class
actions has roughly doubled since the pas-
sage of the PSLRA, so nearly a quarter of all
suits are now dismissed.30 If weaker lawsuits
are dismissed at an early stage before compa-
nies must bear the cost of discovery, then
companies will bear minimal expense from
those suits, although they may still suffer
some reputational harm.
The twin findings of more filings and
more dismissals are seemingly contradictory.
Why would plaintiffs’ lawyers waste time and
effort filing suits that are likely to be dis-
missed? Plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that the
upsurge in filings simply reflects a massive
expansion in the amount of fraud being
committed. The plaintiffs’ bar can find sup-
port for their position in concerns expressed
by the SEC and other policymakers about the
quality of financial reporting. The only dif-
ference post-PSLRA, say the lawyers, is that
meritorious suits are now being dismissed. 
An alternative explanation for the surge in
filings is that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are inca-
pable of sorting fraud from misjudgment or
bad luck on the basis of the information
available to them. Consequently, they sue on
the basis of bad news that may reflect either.
If they can withstand the defendant’s
inevitable motion to dismiss, they can gain
access to discovery of the corporation’s inter-
nal documents in an attempt to determine
whether there has been fraud. A higher dis-
missal rate means that plaintiffs’ lawyers
need to file more suits in hopes that a rea-
sonable number will make it through to dis-
covery. If plaintiffs’ lawyers are simply filing
more suits in the hope that a few will “stick,”
the PSLRA may not have achieved its goal of
discouraging frivolous class actions. But if
those frivolous actions are quickly dismissed,
the costs of defending them are greatly
diminished. Moreover, the higher dismissal
rate suggests that the sanctions that flow
from securities fraud class actions are more
precisely targeted—that is, weaker suits are
more often dismissed. If only strong claims
lead to settlements, class actions are produc-
ing more cost-effective deterrence.
Deterrence is determined not only by the
precision, but also the magnitude, of sanc-
tions. Studies have found that monetary set-
tlements are higher for post-PSLRA cases,
but they are lower when expressed as a per-
centage of potential damages.31 If securities
fraud class action settlements now include a
higher percentage of meritorious claims (as a
result of the higher dismissal rate), then
higher absolute sanctions are appropriate.
The fact that monetary settlements may be a
lower percentage of potential damages is not
a cause for concern. Higher stock prices and
more trading lead to higher potential dam-
ages, so it is no surprise that damages are
greater after 1995 because of rising stock
prices and increased trading during that
time. Given that potential damages are unre-
lated to the social harm stemming from
fraud on the market, it is not essential from a
deterrence perspective that recoveries corre-
spond to those damages. 
The available evidence also shows that
suits naming accountants and underwriters
have led to greater settlements than suits that
do not name them both before and after the
PSLRA was adopted, suggesting that the
PSLRA has not exempted secondary defen-
dants from paying damages. It is more diffi-
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but when the plaintiffs provide evidence that
ties those defendants to the fraud, they are
being forced to pay.
The Stock Market’s Response
One method of assessing the PSLRA’s
impact is by measuring the stock market’s
reaction to the law. That reaction provides
important evidence on the effect of the
PSLRA because shareholders are the intend-
ed beneficiaries of the deterrence produced
by securities fraud class actions. Sharehold-
ers suffer, however, if firms are subjected to
frivolous suits that impose costs but do little
to deter fraud. That tradeoff between the
costs and benefits of class actions should be
reflected in shareholders’ valuations of firms
subject to the PSLRA.
Two stock market reactions are relevant
to an assessment of the PSLRA’s effect. The
first is investors’ reaction to Congress’s over-
ride of President Clinton’s veto of the PSLRA.
Two studies found that the enactment of the
PSLRA was wealth increasing, on average, for
shareholders in high-technology firms (a
favorite target of the class action bar).32
Specifically, there was a significant negative
market reaction to the rumors of President
Clinton’s veto, followed by a significant posi-
tive reaction to the override. Firms at the
highest risk of being sued enjoyed the
strongest positive reaction. Those findings
suggest that shareholders generally believed
that they would benefit from the PSLRA’s
restrictions on private securities litigation.
The second relevant finding from the
stock market came in response to a decision
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, which encom-
passes Silicon Valley, surprised many
observers with its Silicon Graphics decision
interpreting the PSLRA’s requirements for
pleading a securities fraud complaint. Prior
to the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had the least
stringent requirements for pleading fraud of
all circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation in Silicon Graphics, by contrast, is the
most stringent of any circuit, requiring plain-
tiffs to allege facts that would show the
defendants were “deliberately reckless” in
making the misrepresentation that gave rise
to the fraud claim.33 Not surprisingly, courts
that have adopted that more stringent stan-
dard are more likely to dismiss lawsuits.34
The tougher pleading standard allows a
court to dismiss fraud suits at an early stage
if the court deems they lack merit, but it also
increases the risk that a court will dismiss
meritorious suits. If cases of genuine fraud
were dismissed or never filed, deterrence
would be undermined. Marilyn Johnson,
Karen Nelson, and I did a study of the stock
market’s reaction to the Silicon Graphics deci-
sion for a sample of high-technology compa-
nies. We found a positive market reaction to
the decision, particularly for firms headquar-
tered in the Ninth Circuit and those at great-
est risk of being sued in a securities class
action.35
Those results relating to the enactment
and interpretation of the PSLRA bolster the
conclusion that market participants believed
that its restrictions on private securities liti-
gation generally benefited shareholders of
high-technology firms. That reaction pre-
sumably reflects an assessment by those par-
ticipants that the PSLRA discourages the fil-
ing of nonmeritorious claims, without undu-
ly chilling meritorious claims and the deter-
rent benefits that they may produce. That
conclusion comes, however, with a caveat:
The assessment of investors may have been
fueled by popular perceptions and anecdotal
evidence. Market participants may not have
had the information or expertise to assess
whether the PSLRA had its desired effect of
reducing nonmeritorious claims. 
Do the Merits Matter More?
Although market reactions are instruc-
tive, the more fundamental question is
whether the PSLRA has achieved its central
goal, the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits. As
noted above, the overall number of suits has
not declined, despite the barriers to class
actions erected by the PSLRA. After a brief
initial dip, the number of securities fraud
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exceeded, its pre-PSLRA level. On its face, the
increase in filings suggests that the PSLRA
may have done little to discourage the filing
of frivolous suits. It is worth noting in this
regard, however, that it appears that a small-
er percentage of cases is being filed in the
Ninth Circuit subsequent to the Silicon
Graphics decision, suggesting that the strin-
gent standard adopted there has discouraged
some suits.36
A second study that I did with Marilyn
Johnson and Karen Nelson provides more
direct evidence on whether the PSLRA has
discouraged frivolous suits. Once again
studying a sample of high-tech companies,
we found that factors relating to the likeli-
hood of fraud—principally restatements of
accounting results and insider trading—play
a more important role in explaining the inci-
dence, the type of allegations, and the resolu-
tion of class actions post-PSLRA. Factors
relating to fraud were generally insignificant
before the passage of the PSLRA. Factors
relating to damages (such as share turnover
and market capitalization), not surprisingly,
have been important in explaining class
actions both before and after the passage of
the PSLRA. Damages factors, although
unlikely to correlate with fraud, will always
play a role in determining the incidence of
suit because greater potential damages
claims correlate with greater attorneys’ fees.
Nonetheless, the results show a closer rela-
tion between factors related to fraud and
securities class actions after the passage of
the PSLRA, suggesting that Congress
achieved at least part of its objective in enact-
ing the law. 
In sum, the empirical evidence produced
to date suggests that the PSLRA has made
the plaintiffs’ bar work harder for a living.
The PSLRA discourages plaintiffs’ lawyers
from using lawsuits to fish for evidence.
Today, complaints are better drafted, with
stronger support for allegations of fraud.
Marginal cases are more likely to be dis-
missed and less likely to lead to a settlement.
In sum, the PSLRA has made the merits mat-
ter more to attorneys considering a suit. 
Should the PSLRA Be
Repealed?
The evidence above suggests that the
PSLRA has reduced the costs to corporate
issuers of defending meritless class actions
and encouraged plaintiffs’ lawyers to target
their lawsuits more precisely. Despite that
evidence, calls for the repeal of securities
fraud class action reform have been growing
in the wake of revelations of fraud at a num-
ber of high-profile companies.
Did the PSRLA Cause a Fraud Epidemic?
The impetus for calls to repeal the PSLRA
is easy to understand. A spate of accounting
and corporate governance scandals followed
shortly after the passage of a law that made it
more difficult to sue for fraud. And it’s not
just the fraud headlines that support this
impulse—the number of restatements of
accounting results has generally been on the
rise.37 Some use that chronology to imply a
causal relation between the PSLRA and cor-
porate fraud. 
That logic is based on publicity rather
than sound statistical inference. After a flur-
ry of headlines trumpeting corporate wrong-
doing, it is easy to be misled by a small num-
ber of high-profile cases, but the Enrons and
Worldcoms are not representative of
America’s corporations. The United States
has more than 15,000 public companies, and
only a handful of them have been implicated
in wrongdoing. Fraud will always be with us,
and it would be a mistake to conclude from
what may be little more than a statistically
insignificant blip that we are headed toward
a financial apocalypse. The increased num-
ber of restatements is also misleading. Many
of those restatements are the result of shifts
by the SEC in interpreting accounting rules.
A company’s failure to anticipate a change in
the SEC’s position does not equate to fraud.
We should also remember the other factors
in the financial environment that helped lead
to the corporate scandals. Most conspicuous















business concept, no matter how shaky, that
had some connection to the Internet.
Companies with actual earnings became
passé, rendering quaint guideposts such as
price-to-earnings ratios irrelevant. We are
more sober now but still reluctant to admit
that we were taken in by the hysteria for all
things high tech—just like the now-failed whiz
kids who dreamed of a business revolution. 
Another ingredient was the popularization
of stock options at the expense of more tradi-
tional forms of compensation, such as cash.
The stock option frenzy of the late 1990s was
driven in part by companies with good ideas,
but little cash, that needed to attract talented
employees. But that frenzy was also driven by
an excise tax that Congress imposed on “exces-
sive” executive compensation in 1993—yet
another example of the law of unintended
consequences.38 The excise tax excluded
“incentive” compensation, so not surprisingly,
compensation consultants found a way to
drive a Mack truck through that loophole.
The result was an enormous spike in the use of
stock options, with a corresponding motiva-
tion to keep those options “in the money.” For
the options to be lucrative, the current price of
the stock had to exceed the exercise price of
the option. And if accounting results had to be
massaged a little to inflate the stock price,
what was the harm? We have now found out
what the harm was—a dramatic loss in
investor confidence. Stock options are a useful
component of many compensation packages,
helping to align managers’ and investors’
interests, but they are no panacea. Whatever
the relative merits of options and cash com-
pensation, there is certainly no reason for
Congress to put its fat thumb on the scale in
favor of one over the other.
Proposed Reforms
A number of bills were introduced in
Congress during 2002 aimed at undoing
securities class action reform. Not surprising-
ly, given Arthur Andersen’s role in the demise
of Enron, accountants were the central tar-
get. Those bills include proposals to bring
back joint and several liability for secondary
defendants and restore aiding-and-abetting
liability and racketeering liability under
RICO for securities violations.39 Another pro-
posal would eliminate the discovery stay if
auditors were named as defendants, allowing
the plaintiffs’ attorney immediate access to
the accountants’ work papers.40
Is diminished liability for secondary
defendants a real concern? Hardly. The repu-
tational sanction for complicity in fraud is
severe, as Andersen’s bankruptcy filing after
its conviction for obstruction of justice
shows. Professionals such as accountants are
in the business of renting their reputation to
corporations. Once the accountants lose
their reputation for integrity, they have noth-
ing left to sell. The market sanction for mis-
behavior is swifter and surer than any pun-
ishment that Congress is likely to devise.
Moreover, the PSLRA does not let sec-
ondary defendants off scot-free. Proportion-
ate liability does not mean that accountants,
lawyers, and underwriters are immune from
liability. It only means that they are responsi-
ble only for the incremental harm caused by
their participation in the fraud. Prior to the
PSLRA, plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely went
after accountants, lawyers, and underwriters,
who under joint and several liability could be
forced to pay the entire judgment, even if
their culpability for the fraud was slight.
Under the PSLRA, defendants who are only
tangentially involved in the fraud will not
face potentially bankrupting liability. 
But secondary defendants who actively
participate in the fraud get no such relief.
Under the PSLRA, defendants are only enti-
tled to the protection of proportionate liabil-
ity when they lack knowledge of the fraud.
Even then they can be required to pay an
additional 50 percent above the damages
based on their fault if the issuer is insolvent.
Proportionate liability offers no protection at
all for secondary defendants if a jury con-
cludes that they were knee-deep in the fraud.
Ernst & Young no doubt took that possibili-
ty into account when it paid $335 million to
settle the lawsuit against it resulting from the
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must still consider the risk of a securities
fraud class action when a client tries to pres-
sure them into acquiescing in a dubious
interpretation of accounting principles.
Another proposal relating to accountants
would reverse the Supreme Court’s 1994
Central Bank decision, which eliminated “aid-
ing-and-abetting” liability for securities
fraud.41 Congress considered reversing
Central Bank when it was debating the
PSLRA, but it instead concluded that only
the SEC should be authorized to pursue
individuals who have facilitated but not per-
petrated securities fraud.42 A bill was intro-
duced to extend that authority to private liti-
gants. The argument was that expanded lia-
bility would encourage accountants and
lawyers to be more vigorous “gatekeepers,”
denying defrauders access to the financial
markets. Without audited financial state-
ments and offering documents produced by
accountants and lawyers, defrauders would
not be able to sell securities at all.
As noted above, secondary defendants do
not enjoy immunity from liability under cur-
rent law. If they make misrepresentations
upon which investors rely (such as certifying
false financial statements), secondary defen-
dants can and will be held liable. Central Bank
only excludes liability when secondary defen-
dants have made no false statement them-
selves. That is hardly a startling principle.
The basic purpose of securities law is to pro-
tect investors who reasonably rely on infor-
mation. If the accountant or lawyer has made
no statement, then investors have not relied
on that person in making their investment
decision. On the other hand, if the secondary
defendants have induced reliance by
investors, they will be on the hook, as the
recent decision by the trial judge in the
Enron class action confirmed.43
Aiding-and-abetting liability transforms
the law of fraud from a sanction for mislead-
ing people into a sanction for failing to
uncover fraud committed by others. That
might make sense if we thought it would be
proper to transform professionals into quasi-
fraud police. But there are good reasons why
audits of public companies are not full-scale
investigations for fraud. A forensic audit to
uncover fraud requires an enormous invest-
ment of time and resources and therefore
costs a multiple of the typical charge for an
annual audit. A forensic audit is a huge waste
for the overwhelming majority of public
companies that are not engaged in fraud.
And the cost of training lawyers to uncover
fraud would be staggering—the average cor-
porate lawyer is doing well to understand the
transactions that she is asked to document,
not to mention looking behind them for
nefarious purposes. Uncovering fraud
requires specialized expertise that can be
developed only through extensive and expen-
sive training.
The balance struck by the PSRLA is a sen-
sible compromise. The SEC has the authori-
ty to pursue secondary defendants with
knowledge of the fraud. Because the com-
mission has more fraud to pursue than it has
time or manpower, we can be confident that
the agency will not abuse its aiding-and-abet-
ting authority. Facing the knowledge stan-
dard, the SEC will pursue secondary defen-
dants only when there is clear evidence of
wrongdoing. For the plaintiffs’ bar, by con-
trast, aiding-and-abetting authority is one
more weapon with which to shake down a
settlement from a deep pocket.
The exclusion of securities fraud from
RICO’s civil provisions was endorsed at the
time of enactment even by then–SEC chair-
man Arthur Levitt, no friend of defrauders.
That exclusion prevents plaintiffs’ attorneys
from using the in terrorem threat of treble
damages as a means of coercing settlements
from defendants. Given that potential dam-
ages are already excessive under the damages
measure of the securities laws, the added
threat of civil RICO served no useful pur-
pose. More important, it is specious to sug-
gest that anyone who is not deterred by the
prospect of billions of dollars in damages is
going to be deterred by trebling those dam-
ages under RICO. Bankrupt is bankrupt.
The proposal to eliminate the discovery









ly repeal the discovery stay altogether. Access
to the work papers, with all of the details that
they provide about a company’s business, not
only compromises corporate confidentiality,
it also ensures that auditors will be routinely
named as defendants so that plaintiffs’
lawyers can go back to their old practice of
using discovery as a “fishing expedition” for
fraud. Whether or not the work papers reveal
fraud, they will allow the plaintiffs’ lawyers to
amend their complaint and plead sufficient
detail to get past a motion to dismiss. That
will bring the coercive threat of discovery
against the company and its officers to bear in
settlement negotiations. The PSLRA’s barriers
against nuisance suits, which have greatly
reduced the expense of defending such
actions, would be completely eroded.
Another bill would repeal the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act,44 a 1998
supplement to the PSLRA. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
initially responded to the restrictions that
the PSLRA imposes on federal securities class
actions by filing their suits in state court,
where the PSLRA does not apply. Congress
closed that loophole in 1998 by preempting
class actions based on state securities fraud
law for certain classes of securities. Undoing
that preemption would reverse the improve-
ments in securities fraud class action proce-
dures that have been produced by the
PSLRA.
A final proposal calls for lowering the stan-
dard required for fraud under the securities
laws from scienter, which means actual knowl-
edge or at least a reckless disregard for the
truth, to negligence, which translates to
“would a reasonable person have believed that
he was telling the truth?” The negligence stan-
dard has obvious appeal—We’re all reasonable
people, aren’t we?—but there are good reasons
for using scienter instead. The scienter
requirement is the chief bulwark against
“fraud by hindsight”—the temptation to con-
clude that a defendant accused of fraud must
have known that the bad thing was going to
happen at the time of his statements because
the bad thing eventually did happen.
Although it may be difficult for the average
juror to believe, it is often true that the chief
executive officer and the board did not know
that a fraud was being committed. Public cor-
porations cannot always manage information
flows among multiple divisions and elaborate
management hierarchies. The scienter stan-
dard counteracts those biases by requiring
strong evidence of an intentional misstate-
ment before a defendant can be held liable for
fraud. If there is evidence in corporate docu-
ments or from other employees that the defen-
dant did know the truth at the time of the mis-
statements, the jury is free to ignore the defen-
dant’s denials of knowledge. Claims by corpo-
rate officers that “they didn’t know” of the
fraud are a risky litigation strategy. 
A Better Alternative
Instead of rolling back securities fraud
class action reform, Congress should consid-
er new reforms that would target the deter-
rent effect of securities fraud class actions
where that would do the most good. One of
the salutary developments in securities fraud
litigation to come out of the recent spate of
accounting scandals has been the targeting
of corporate officers in fraud suits.
Traditionally, class action settlements have
not included a contribution from corporate
officers individually. Plaintiffs’ lawyers forgo
that source of recovery because they can
reach a settlement much more quickly if they
do not insist on a contribution from the indi-
vidual defendants. The only reason that offi-
cers and directors are named is to improve
the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s bargaining position. 
Faced with a substantial number of bank-
rupt companies with no assets to pursue,
however, the class action bar has turned its
sights on the individuals who are actually
culpable for the fraud. Some of the officers
were able to abandon ship with substantial
gains by cashing out stock options before the
collapse. When Al Dunlap, the former CEO
of Sunbeam Corporation, recently was
forced to contribute to the settlement in the
class action arising out of that firm’s bank-
ruptcy, it was a “man bites dog” story for peo-
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actions. But the Dunlap story could become
a trend. Those stock option millions are a
tempting target for plaintiffs’ lawyers
stymied by bankrupt corporate issuers. 
Deterrence is maximized by sanctioning
the person who is most at fault for the fraud.
Accordingly, the pursuit of culpable corpo-
rate officers should not be limited to cases
involving bankrupt firms. Congress can
encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to go after the
real wrongdoers in every fraud case by alter-
ing the damages remedy for Rule 10b-5 fraud
on the market cases. The current rule holds
corporations responsible for the entire loss of
all of the shareholders who paid too much
for their shares as a result of fraudulent mis-
representations. But that measure exagger-
ates the social harm caused by fraud on the
market because it fails to account for the
gains of equally innocent shareholders who
sold at the inflated price. In most cases, the
losses and gains will be a wash for sharehold-
ers in the aggregate, even though some indi-
vidual shareholders will have suffered sub-
stantial losses.
A better damages rule would focus on
deterrence rather than compensation. Instead
of making corporations liable for all losses
resulting from misstatements, we should force
defendants to disgorge their gains (or expect-
ed gains, for those who fail in their scheme)
from the fraud. So if a corporation were issu-
ing securities at the time it was distorting the
market price of its stock, it would be required
to disgorge the amount by which it inflated
the price of the securities that it sold to the
investors who bought them. In most fraud on
the market cases, however, the corporation has
not benefited from the misrepresentation that
is the basis of the class action. Indeed, the cor-
poration is usually the victim of the fraud. The
corporation is victimized when an executive is
awarded a bonus that is undeserved because
he creates the appearance of having met the
target stock price. The corporation is also vic-
timized when a chief executive officer keeps
his job for a bit longer because he creates the
appearance of adequate performance. The
proper remedy in such cases is for the execu-
tive to return the bonus or salary earned from
the fraud to the corporation. If the executive
benefits from the fraud by cashing out stock
options at an inflated price, those profits can
be paid over to the corporation. And for egre-
gious cases, civil sanctions imposed by the
SEC and criminal prosecution by the Justice
Department will always be available.
The objective here should be to ensure
that fraud does not pay. The recently enacted
Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes a beginning
toward making executives pay by requiring
them to reimburse the corporation for any
incentive compensation (as well as profits
from any stock sales) if the corporation is
required to restate its financial results.45 The
big money for plaintiffs’ attorneys, however,
remains in pursuing the corporation and its
insurers. If we took away the corporation’s
exposure when it did not benefit from the
fraud, we would substantially increase the
attorneys’ incentive to pursue the executives
responsible for the fraud.
Conclusion
The call to roll back securities litigation
reform comes as no surprise in the wake of a
series of high-profile scandals at major pub-
lic corporations and investment banks. The
intuitive link between the PSLRA’s barriers to
lawsuits and the misbehavior that has
unfolded in corporate boardrooms and
financial markets is all too easy to make.
Unfortunately, public policy is too frequent-
ly driven by such intuitions based on the lat-
est headlines rather than hard evidence.
In this case, the hard evidence does not
support the call to repeal the PSLRA.
Securities fraud class actions are being filed at
a record pace. The PLSRA has not discouraged
the filing of lawsuits. Although a higher per-
centage of those suits is being dismissed, the
ones that survive lead to larger settlements.
That result should come as no surprise
because the PSLRA demands stronger evi-
dence from plaintiffs’ attorneys before they
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defending a securities fraud class action. Cases
that meet that tougher standard are worth
more in settlement negotiations.
The combination of higher settlements and a
smaller percentage of those cases getting to trial
suggests that securities fraud class actions are
now doing a better job of deterring fraud. Current
proposals to repeal securities fraud class actions
would give plaintiffs’ lawyers another weapon
with which to coerce settlements. But the wide
net those proposals would cast offers little in the
way of enhanced deterrence. Strong sanctions are
appropriate for defrauders, but we must ensure
that those sanctions are imposed only on culpa-
ble parties. Honest businesspeople and profes-
sionals need to be protected against threats
intended solely to generate larger settlements and
attorneys’ fees. Investors are the intended benefi-
ciaries of the deterrence produced by securities
fraud class actions, but they also bear the costs
when class actions get out of control. Investors
bear those costs through higher insurance premi-
ums for directors’ and officers’ insurance, as well
as higher fees that accountants, lawyers, and
investment bankers will charge if they face unjus-
tified litigation risk.
The PSLRA struck a balance between the
goal of deterrence and the costs that securi-
ties fraud class actions impose on investors.
The evidence to date suggests that the bal-
ance struck was a reasonable one. Congress
will not be doing investors a favor if it opens
the door to frivolous class action lawsuits
and coercive settlements in its frenzy to get
tough on corporate wrongdoers.
Notes
1.  Lori Cabro, “I Told You So,” CFO 63 (September
2002): 67 (interviewing Lerach). 
2.  Stephen Labaton, “Enron Scandal Shocks Even
Those Who Helped It Along,” New York Times,
February 3, 2002.
3.  Patrick Leahy, chairman, Senate Judiciary
Committee, Statement at Senate Hearing on
Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from
Enron’s Fall, February 6, 2002.
4.  Paul G. Mahoney, “Precaution Costs and the
Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets,” Virginia
Law Review 78 (1992): 623.
5.  Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
77k, makes issuers strictly liable for misstate-
ments in a registration statement for a public
offering. From 1999 to 2000, approximately 14
percent of securities litigation cases involved alle-
gations of violations of the 1933 Securities Act
that regulates the offering of securities. See
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, “2001 Securities
Litigation Study,” www.10b5.com/2001Securities
LitigationStudy.pdf. 
6.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
7.  There could of course be a decline in share
price attributable to greater uncertainty in valu-
ing the company because of the loss of credibility.
That decline, however, is likely to be insignificant
relative to the price drop from artificially inflated
levels when the fraud is revealed. 
8.  “Cendant Corp. Agrees to Record Payment to Settle
All Financial Fraud Allegations,” Securities Regulation &
Law Reporter 31 (December 13, 1999): 1618.
9.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 742-43 (1975).
10. A. C. Pritchard, “Markets as Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Monitors,” Virginia Law Review
85 (1999): 925. 
11. A stock option is said to be “in the money”
when the exercise or strike price is equal to or
greater than the stock price.
12. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995).
13. H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, at 17 (1995).
14. S. Rep. No. 104-98.
15. The provision is unusual in that Congress
based it on a proposal by two law professors. See
Elliot J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman, “Let the
Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities
Class Actions,” Yale Law Journal 104 (1995): 2053.
16. H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, at 34 (1995).
17. Ibid. at 16, 17.
18. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 14.
19. H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, at 17.











now doing a bet-
ter job of deter-
ring fraud.
21. Ibid.
22. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 37–38 (1995).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1).
24. 15 U.S.C. A. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(B).
27. Marilyn F. Johnson et al., “The Impact of
Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of
Forward-Looking Information by High Techno-
logy Firms,” Journal of Accounting Research 39
(2001): 297.
28. For example, the University of California was
able to negotiate a fee of less than 10 percent in
the litigation against Enron. Maureen Milford,
“UC Takes Charge of Enron Suit,” National Law
Journal, March 4, 2002, p. A15.
29. Michael A. Perino, “Did the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Work?” University of Illinois
Law Review (forthcoming 2003). 
30. Todd S. Foster et al., “Trends in Securities
Litigation and the Impact of the PSLRA,”
National Economic Research Associates, 1999,
unpublished manuscript in author’s files.
31. Laura E. Simmons, “Securities Lawsuits:
Settlement Statistics for Post–Reform Act Cases,”
Cornerstone Research, 1999, unpublished manu-
script in author’s files; and Mukesh Baja et al.,
“Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical
Analysis,“ Law and Economics Consulting Group,
2000, unpublished manuscript in author’s files.
32. Marilyn F. Johnson et al., “Shareholder Wealth
Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995,” Review of Accounting Studies 5 (2000):
217; and D. Katherine Spiess and Paula A. Tkac,
“The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: The Stock Market Casts Its Vote,”
Managerial and Decision Economics 18 (1997): 545.
33. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970
(9th Cir. 1999).
34. Joseph A. Grundfest and A. C. Pritchard,
“Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation,” Stanford Law Review 54 (2002): 629.
35. Marilyn F. Johnson et al, “In re Silicon Graphics
Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from
the Interpretation of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard,”
Southern California Law Review 73 (2000): 773.
36. Perino.
37. Financial Executives Institute, “Quantitative
Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting,”
2001, unpublished manuscript in author’s files.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 162.
39. Aiding-and-abetting liability targets professionals
who facilitate fraud committed by others.
Racketeering liability under the RICO statute provides
for treble damages for defendants found to have
engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. That criminal
activity need not have led to a criminal prosecution,
nor must it be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As a
consequence, ordinary business torts can be the basis
for a racketeering claim. The proposal to restore joint
and several liability and aiding-and-abetting liability
can be found in Sections 12(a) and 14 of the
Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of 2002 (H.R.
3818) introduced by former representative John
LaFalce (D-N.Y.). In the Senate, Sen. Richard Shelby
(R-Ala.) introduced the Investor Protection Act of 2002
(S. 1933) that contained those same provisions and
that would have repealed the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998. RICO liability would
have been restored by the Securities Fraud Prevention
Act of 2002 (H.R. 3644), introduced by Rep. John
Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.).
40. This proposal can be found in Section 12(e) of
the Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of
2002. 
41. Central Bank of Denver v. First Central Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (e).
43. In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA
Litigation, 2002 WL 31854963 (S.D. Tex.).
44. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
45. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304 (July 30, 2002).
17
Published by the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis is a regular series evaluating government policies and offer-
ing proposals for reform. Nothing in Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before congress. Contact the
Cato Institute for reprint permission. Additional copies of Policy Analysis are $6.00 each ($3.00 each for five
or more). To order, or for a complete listing of available studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000
Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, call toll free 1-800-767-1241 (noon - 9 p.m. eastern
time), fax (202) 842-3490, or visit our website at www.cato.org.
